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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK, 
Petitioners/Appellants, 
vs.
 !: 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, of ] 
the State of Utah, 
Respondent/Appellees. ] 
i REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
) CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK 
Case No. 20040162 CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK 
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Pursuant to this Court's Order dated November 15, 2 004, 
Appellants Craig Burr and Lowell Clark (herein "Burr and 
Clark") submit this Reply Brief for consideration by the 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE RECENT UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISION IN 
BUCKNER v. KENNARD, 99 P.3d 842 (UTAH 2004) 
SUBSTANTIVELY SUPPORTS BURR AND CLARK'S 
POSITION IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
A. The Significance and Relevance of Buckner v. Kennard, 
99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004) to the Case at Bar~ 
In Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004), the 
i 
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Utah Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision determining 
that certain merit employees of governmental entities have 
been imbued with statutory protections such that they must 
receive "equitable" compensation vis-a-vis their co-workers. 
Chief Justice Durham's decision is a landmark decision 
because it reflects the first time that our Utah Appellate 
Courts have recognized the enforceability of statutory 
protections for merit employees regarding employee's 
compensation. More importantly, and as demonstrated 
hereinbelow, Burr and Clark respectfully submit that Buckner 
compels and warrants a reversal of the Final Decision issued 
by the Utah Career Service Review Board in this matter. 
B. The Statutory Pay Inequity Framework after Buckner, 
In Buckner, the Plaintiffs were Salt Lake County 
Sheriff deputies whose employment terms and conditions are 
governed by the County Personnel Management Act, U.C.A. 17-
3 3-1, et. seq (herein UCPMA") and the County Deputy 
Sheriff's Merit System, U.C.A. 17-30-1, et. seq. (herein 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"County Sheriff's Merit System"). In the CPMA,1 the 
Legislature enacted two (2) statutory provisions that 
address "pay equity"2 issues. .•;- --; > -
In the first CPMA pay equity statutory provision, at 
U.C.A. 17-33-3(2) (2001) , the Legislature requires that 
county employees be provided with equitable and adequate 
compensation: 
"17-33-3. Merit principles. 
It is the policy of this state that each county 
may establish a personnel system administered in 
a manner that will provide for the effective 
"implementation of the following merit 
principles: 
...(2) provision of equitable and adequate 
compensation; "3 (Emphasis supplied). 
1. A review of the County Sheriff's Merit System does not 
reveal any pay equity statutory provisions. Moreover, Chie 
Justice Durham's opinion in Buckner does not cite to any 
statutory provisions in the County Sheriff's Merit Systems 
as support for the Court's analysis of pay equity issues. 
2. To the extent a governmental entity fails to pay its 
employees equitably, Burr and Clark submit a pay inequity 
circumstance results therefrom. Burr and Clark may use the 
phrase "pay equity" and "pay inequity" in this brief with 
the intent that the phrases are interchangeable. 
3. Ostensibly because the briefs on appeal in Buckner do 
not include U.C.A. 17-33-3(2), Chief Justice Durham's 
opinion in Buckner does not address this statutory 
provision. U.C.A. 17-33-3(2) strengthens the legal 
underpinning that the Legislature intended to prohibit pay 
inequities. 
^ 
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In the second CPMA pay equity statutory provision, at 
U.C.A. 17-33-5(3) (b) (xiii) (2001), the Legislature required 
equitable application of employees' salary ranges: 
"U.C.A. 17-33-5. Office of personnel management-
-Director--Appointment and responsibilities--
Pe.rs_onnel^ jcules _ 
...(3) (b) The Rules shall provide for: 
...(xiii) preparation, maintenance, and revision 
of a position classification plan for all 
positions in the career service, based upon 
similarity of duties performed and 
responsibilities assumed, so that the same 
qualifications may reasonably be required for, 
and the same schedule of pay may be equitably 
applied to, all positions in the same class, the 
compensation plan, in order to maintain a high 
quality public work force, to take into account 
the responsibility and difficulty of the work, 
the comparative pay and benefits needed to 
compete in the labor market and to stay in 
proper alignment with other similar governmental 
units, and other factors;" (Emphasis supplied) 
(2001). 
Similarly, Burr and Clark have statutory protections to 
be compensated equally and equitably that are found in three 
statutes codified as part of the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act (USPMA), U.C.A. 67-19-1, et seq. (1979) . 
First, in U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(a)(1997), the Legislature has 
specifically mandated that every state career service 
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employee is entitled to equal pay for equal work: 
"(3)(a) The director shall prepare, maintain, 
and revise a position classification plan for 
each employee position not exempted under 
Subsection (2) to provide equal pay.for equal 
work."4 Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
12(3) (a) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) . 
Second, in U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (b) (1997) as amended 
2 003,5 the Legislature has mandated that each career service 
employee is entitled to have his/her salary range applied 
equitably to him/her: 
"(3)(b) Classification of positions shall be 
based upon similarity of duties performed and 
responsibilities assumed, so that the same job *{;. 
requirements and the same salary range may be 
applied equitably to each position in the same 
class."6 Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
4. There is no comparable statutory provision in the CPMA 
to the USPMA's mandate of "equal pay for equal work" under 
67-19-12 (3) (a) . 
5. Although 67-19-12(3) was amended in 2003, this provision 
was unchanged. 
6. UDOC's interpretation of U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(b)(1997) as 
amended 2 0 03 fails to give any meaning to the language 
"applied equitably to each position." If one deletes the 
language "applied equitably to each position," then this 
statute means what UDOC claims it means: all that is 
required is the same salary range must be assigned to each 
classification of positions. However, the Legislature 
included the language "applied equitably to each position." 
In order to give meaning to each of the words of the 
statute, "applied equitably to each position" must mean 
something more than just the same salary range. Not only 
c; 
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12(3) (b) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) / 
Third, in U.C.A. 67-19-3.1(1)(b)(2000), the Legislature 
mandated the state career service system must provide 
equitable compensation to career service employees: 
"67-19-3.1. Principles governing 
interpretation of chapter and adoption of 
rules. 
(1) The department shall establish a career 
service system designed in a manner that will 
provide for the effective implementation of 
the following merit principles: 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive 
compensation."7 Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
must there be the same salary range, but the salary range 
must be applied in an equitable manner to each employee 
occupying a position in the same classification. Burr and 
Clark are not requesting identical pay to the individuals 
they compared themselves to, but are requesting an "equity 
adjustment" consisting of a four (4) step increase to be 
paid in an "equitable" (although still less) manner compared 
to those employees who have less experience and/or education 
but are paid at a higher rate of compensation. 
7. In comparing the CPMA's "equitable and adequate 
compensation" (U.C.A. 17-33-3(2)) to the USPMA's "equitable 
and competitive compensation" (U.C.A. 67-19-3.1 (1) (b)) , 
"competitive" means more then just "adequate." For 
instance, UDOC in the past has granted ASI's based on the 
principals of "equitable and competitive compensation" by 
granting/justifying individual and across the board pay 
increases based on external (between state and private 
sector) and internal (between individuals in the same salary 
range) pay inequities. See, Burr and Clark's Appeal Brief 
at pages 14, 29-30 citing to R. 231 (Transcript p. 32) , R. 
232 (Transcript p. 215-216). 
£ 
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3.1(1)(b)(2000)(Emphasis supplied). 
C. The Scope of the Buckner Decision. 
The discussion below will include three areas of focus 
regarding the scope of the Buckner decision: What Buckner 
does; what Buckner does not do; and, what Buckner left 
unresolved. 
1. What Buckner Does. 
Buckner recognizes that merit public employees may 
pursue their rights to obtain "pay equity:" 
"Nothing in these provisions can be read as 
either an express or implied grant of a right of 
action to employees who have a grievance of pay 
equity. Instead, the legislature has provided 
for an appeal procedure to a career service 
council, with judicial review limited to the 
record of such appeal." Buckner at 855. 
Buckner then provides two (2) "judicial'' methods 
whereby public employees may pursue remedy of pay inequity 
circumstances. The first method public employees can pursue 
relief through is the grievance process with judicial 
review: 
"The CPMA [County Personnel Management Act] 
provides the deputies with a remedy at law: a 
grievance process with judicial review." Buckner 
at 857. 
7 
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The second method public employees can pursue 
remedy of pay inequity is through a writ of mandamus: 
"Moreover, as the county concedes, employees who 
are being paid inequitably normally have a 
remedy in an equitable cause of action seeking 
to compel a county to comply with the pay equity 
provision. See, e.g., Green v. Turner, 2 00 0 UT 
54, 4 P.3d 789; Glendale City Employees1 Assfn, 
Inc. v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal.3d 328, 124 
Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609 (1975)." Id. 
2. What Buckner Does Not Do. 
Buckner does not allow an award of back pay if the 
applicable statutes do not explicitly provide for the same8: 
"Moreover, there is no express grant to county 
employees of a remedy of back pay for pay 
inconsistent with section 17-33-
5 (3) (b) (xiii) ...The legislature's silence cannot 
be interpreted as revealing an intent that 
employees have a right to seek back pay as a 
remedy for a claim to pay equity under the 
CPMA." Buckner at 855. 
Buckner also does not provide a private cause of 
action9 in absence of express statutory authority: 
"However, the CPMA contains no express grant to 
employees of a cause of action based on the pay' 
equity provision [17-33-5(3) (b) (xiii)]..." 
8. Burr and Clark are not seeking an award of any back pay 
accruing prior to the filing of their grievance. 
9. Burr and Clark correctly pursued resolution of their pay 
equity circumstance through the administrative process . 
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"Nothing in these provisions can be read as 
either an express or implied grant of a right of 
action to employees who have a grievance of pay 
equity. Instead, the legislature has provided 
for an appeal procedure to a career service 
council, with judicial review limited to the 
record of such appeal." Buckner at 854-5. 
3. What Buckner Left Unresolved. 
Ostensibly because the Buckner plaintiffs had not 
exhausted the administrative remedies available to them, the 
Utah Supreme Court did not decided whether Salt Lake County 
had complied with the statutory pay equity mandate contained 
in the CPMA: 
''Because we hold that the deputies have no 
breach of contract claim and that they have 
neither a private statutory right of action 
under the CPMA or the Merit Act, nor an 
equitable claim for back pay, we do not reach 
the issues of governmental immunity, notice, the 
county's compliance with the pay provisions, the . 
statute of limitations, or attorney's fees." 
Buckner at 858. 
D. Application of Buckner to the Case at Bar. 
1. What Constitutes a Pay Inequity. 
The Department of Human Resource Management (herein 
UDHRM") has described a pay inequity as: 
"The definition of an inequity is an injustice 
or unfairness as it relates to employees' 
compensation. An inequity as it relates to 
9 
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salaries of employees in the same classification 
would be evidenced by difference salaries paid 
to different employees when other variables are 
the same or equal. Variables to considers are 
education, experience, hire dates/rates, 
performance ratings, merit increase amounts, 
etc." Grievant's Exhibit 7, R. 000252-259, at 
256, a true and correct copy of which is 
highlighted and attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Letter dated August 8, 1990, from Earl J. 
Banner, Executive Director of DHRM. (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Then DHRM Executive Director Earl Banner further 
explained that: 
"The salary range for the specific 
classification represents equity for all who are 
performing the duties/responsibilities in that 
classification. The actual salary on the range 
is dependent on a great number of variables. 
The variables justify different salary rates for 
people in the same classification and salary 
range. Only when the variables are the same, but 
salaries are different, does an inequity exist." 
Grievant's Exhibit 7, at R. 000257. 
Mr. Banner also stated that: 
"Departments are advised that inequities are 
created when a newly hired employee is paid more 
than a current incumbent(s) unless such pay 
differential is justified because of one of the 
following reasons: 
1. Higher educational credentials 
2. More total employment experience 
applicable to the position 
3. Low performance ratings that may have 
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restricted the pay level of the current 
employee(s)." Grievants Exhibit 7. DHRM 
Bulletin from Earl Banner dated July 1, 
1990 at R. 000255. 
Finally, Mr. Banner also refers to a Memorandum from 
another DHRM expert Dick McDonald, which provided examples 
of circumstances that constitute pay inequities: 
u7. Special Salary Adjustments 
Generally, special salary adjustments are only 
approved by DHRM when an inequity can clearly 
be demonstrated. Usually a significant event 
happens or circumstances occur which causes 
the inequity. Some examples are: 
2. New hire employees are hired at a salary 
rate equal to or above those of current 
employees, in the same job classification. 
3. Employees are not given the same percent 
increase when promoted or reclassified, when 
they are in the same job classification. 
5 . Preferential treatment of one employee 
over another employee." Grievants Exhibit 7 
at R. 000259. (Emphasis supplied). 
2. Burr and Clark Presented Substantial Evidence of a 
Pay Inequity. 
The Utah Appellate Courts have defined substantial 
evidence as: 
li 
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"that quantum and quality of relevant evidence 
that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
to support a conclusion.. . (stating evidence is 
not substantial if overwhelmed by other 
evidence or based on mere conclusion). It is 
more than a mere uxscintilla' of evidence and -
something less than the weight of the 
evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n, 842 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citation omitted)." Lucas v. 
Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d 
746, 758 (Utah App. Ct. 1997). 
Burr and Clark proved10 by substantial evidence11 that 
10. It is readily apparent that UDOC's marshalling the 
evidence argument should not be well taken by this court. 
UDOC did not point to one scintilla of competent evidence 
presented at the Step 5 Evidentiary Hearing that Burr & 
Clark purportedly failed to marshal. See, Harding v. Bell, 
57 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Utah 2002) and Grace Drilling Company v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Comm;n of Utah, 776 P.2d 
63, 67-68(Utah App. Ct. 1989). 
The UDOC argues, without any supporting evidence or 
recitation to the evidentiary hearing, that the pay inequity 
is purportedly justifiable based on three ufacts": 1) 
varying initial salaries; 2) Carlson's temporary assumption 
of additional responsibilities; and, 3) diverse and separate 
career paths. In Arguments I and II of Burr and Clark's 
Appeal Brief Burr and Clark marshaled the evidenced as to 
Carlson's temporary assumption of additional 
responsibilities and proved the factual and logical flaws in 
this conclusion - that Ms. Haymond never testified that 
different purported factual justifications 1, 2, or 3 
justified the pay disparities in the case at bar. Assuming, 
arguendo, UDOC's argument that purported factual 
justifications 1, 2, and 3, in the abstract may justify the 
pay inequity, there is no competent evidence that Carlson or 
Harr justifiably received a higher initial salary, that 
Carlson actually assumed any alleged additional duties, or 
that any specific career path justified the disparate pay. 
12 
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the factors of experience, education, and hire dates 
demonstrate that a pay inequity exists12, to wit: 
This is nothing more than an unsupported conclusion that 
cannot be used to justify the pay inequity. Significantly, 
UDOC does not respond to Burr and Clark's substantive 
argument regarding Carlson's "temporary assumption of 
additional duties" or the insufficiency of Ms. Haymond's 
testimony to uphold the CSRB's decision, but simply ignores 
the same in hopes it will be overlooked. 
11. UDOC confuses the substantial evidence test with the 
"any evidence of substance test." UDOC argues that if there 
is any evidence, which can be regarded as supporting the 
CSRB's decision that this Court is required to uphold the 
CSRB's decision. However, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
disavowed the "evidence of any substance test" or "any 
competent evidence" standard of review in Grace Drilling Co 
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 
P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App.Ct. 1989). "Decision supported by 
some or any evidence rule does not mean the decision was 
supported by substantial evidence." Id, at p.68 FN6 
(internal citations omitted). Further "evidence is not 
substantial if overwhelmed by other evidence or based on 
mere conclusion." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service, 949 
P.2d 746, 758 (Utah App. Ct. 1997) (initial citations 
omitted). 
12. At page 5-6 of UDOC's Brief, UDOC makes the misleading 
statement that E.D. Pete Haun/Corrections determined there 
was no pay inequity based on different hire dates, 
performance ratings, tenure and educational attainments. 
However, what E.D. Haun's Final Order actually says is that 
these sort of things could justify different rates of pay, 
but did not actually determine, in this case, whether these 
weighed in UDOC's favor or Burr and Clark's favor. 
In fact, in the comparison that E.D. Haun did make he 
compared Burr to comparable Carlson, and maintained that, 
uMr. Clark has approximately one third of Mr. Carlson's 
experience as a Captain." However, Burr and Clark proved 
13 
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i) Messrs. Carlson and Harr are in the same 
classification (i.e., Captain) and were therefore proper 
comparables to Burr and Clark.13 
ii) The factors of education and experience vis-
a-vis Carlson weigh in Burr's favor. Burr has three years 
more education, 17 months more experience as a captain, and 
eleven months more with the Department of Corrections than 
comparable Carlson, but as of April 2001, was paid $2.37 
that Clark in fact became a captain three months before 
Carlson became a captain. R. 231 (Transcript p. 104, 109, 
128-130), R. 276 (Grievant's Exhibit 12, a copy of which as 
attached to the Addendum to Brief of Appellants as Exhibit 
C). Whether the captain position was titled Captain, IPC 
(Institutional Program Coordinator), or SSIII (Support 
Services Supervisor), the CSRB determined that the three 
positions were interchangeable and Messrs. Carlson and Harr 
were proper comparables. R. 424-5 (fn. 16). Pete Haun's 
decision erroneously applied an insufficient amount of years 
as captain to Burr and Clark, because he did not include 
time spent as an IPC and SSIII when comparing years of 
service as a captain. 
13. UDOC's main defense before the Hearing Officer and the 
Career Service Review Board was first that Carlson and Harr 
were not within the same classification as Burr and Clark 
and were therefore improper comparables. Second, that years 
of experience as an SSIII and IPC did not count towards 
Captain level experience. Burr and Clark proved at the Step 
5 hearing, thus the UDOC no longer disputes, that the 
positions are interchangeable and have been so treated by 
UDOC and are thus proper comparables. 
14 
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less per hour than Carlson. 
iii) The factors of education and experience vis-
a-vis Harr are in Burr's favor. Burr has three years more 
education and 17 months more experience as a captain than 
comparable Harr, but as of April 2001, was paid $4.33 less 
per hour than comparable Harr. 
iv) The factor of experience vis-a-vis Carlson is 
likewise in Clark's favor. Clark has 3 months more 
experience as a captain and 8 years more experience with the 
Department of Corrections than comparable Carlson, but as of 
April 2001, was paid $2.92 less per hour than comparable 
Carlson. See, footnote 7. 
Burr and Clark are legally entitled to prevail on their 
14. UDOC's statement at page 4 of its brief that Burr and 
Clark received seven step increases during the pendency of 
these proceedings is misleading. These pay increases 
occurred over a time period of four years and actually 
increased the pay inequity. Burr and Clark's Grievance was 
filed on May 28, 1998, at which time the pay disparity 
between Burr and Harr was $2.99/hr. in 1998 and grew to 
$4.33/hr. in 2001; the pay disparity between Burr and 
Carlson in 1998 was $1.93/hr. and grew to $2.37/hr. in 2001. 
The pay disparity between Clark and Carlson in 1998 of 
$2.38/hr. grew to $2.92/hr. in 2001. See, Grievant Exhibit 
12, R. 2 76, a copy of which is attached to Addendum to Burr 
and Clark's Appeal Brief as Exhibit C. 
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pay inequity.15 UDOC's argument that Burr and Clark did not 
carry their burden should not be well taken. The burden of 
substantial evidence is not a heavy burden compared to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt or on a preponderance of the 
evidence standards. UDOC is intrinsically arguing that Burr 
and Clark's burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. UDOC would 
like to make Burr and Clark prove that a pay inequity exists 
- which they did - and then prove what the agency's 
justification for the pay inequity was and then to disprove 
that justification as legally insufficient. Burr and Clark 
need not prove UDOC's affirmative defense - if UDOC failed. 
15. UDOC's interpretation of the USPMA to extend only to 
salary ranges and not to individual application of the 
salary within a salary range is inconsistent with Buckner, 
and is neither legally sound nor logical. First, it is 
contrary to DHRM's interpretation of what constitutes a pay 
inequity. See, "What Constitutes a Pay Inequity," at pages 
9-11 hereinabove. Second, then UDOC Executive Director Pete 
Haun's decision is based on the (erroneous) conclusion that 
Burr and Clark have less seniority, education, and 
experience than the comparables and the only comparables 
included captains, not IPC's or SSIII's; therefore a pay 
inequity did not exist. Pete Haun's reasoning, albeit 
wrong, constitutes an admission that an individual's, 
seniority, education and experience are relevant regarding 
whether a pay inequity exits, and if they are relevant then 
a pay inequity means more than the same salary range, it 
means fair application of the salary range. 
1 £ 
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to present legally competent evidence as to the agency's 
justification for the differences in pay and thereby prove 
that a pay inequity does not exist, then UDOC should have 
done so at the evidentiary hearing. Burr and Clark met 
their burden of proof of substantial evidence. 
3. UDOC Failed to Present Any Evidence Justifying the 
Pay Inequity 
Although it is always in the realm of possibility that 
there might exist a potential justification for Burr and 
Clark's pay equity circumstance pay difference, the UDOC 
failed to present any substantial or competent evidence of 
any justification.16 Thus there is no evidence upon which 
this Court could justify their pay inequity. Simply stated 
- either UDOC made a trial strategy decision not to present 
any evidence to justify the pay disparity, or, no evidence 
was presented because no justification for the pay inequity 
exists. Either way, the result is the same, Burr and Clark 
are entitled to prevail on their pay inequity grievance. 
16. The UDOC was aware of its available affirmative 
defenses (i.e., exceptional job performance and increased 
duties), but chose not to avail itself of the same. 
17 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Burr and Clark respectfully 
request this Court enter an order reversing the CSRB's 
Decision and awarding Burr and Clark a four (4) step pay 
increase, retroactive to the date of the initial filing of 
their grievance on May 28, 1998. 
REQUEST FOR PUBLISHED OPINION.AND ORAL ARGUMENT 
Burr and Clark desire oral argument and a published 
decision in this matter. 
DATED this V- day of ^proymlxA __, 2004 . 
Respectfully submitted, 
Phillip 
Carey m r W.(/Dyer, Esq. . Seager, Esq, 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
MI/E:/client/UPEA/UGOP/Burr and Clark/Appeal Brief Reply(Court of Appeals 2) 
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PHILL IP W OYER 
KEVIN C T*IMK£N 
February 11, 2 00 0 
BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 265-5725 AND U.S. MAIL 
H.L. Haun, Executive Director 
Department of Corrections 
6100 South Fashion Boulevard 
Suite 400 
Murray, Utah 84107 
RE: Burr & Clark v. Department of Corrections 
Dear Mr. Haun: 
My clients have identified individuals they believe to be in 
comparable situations to them, but who are paid higher salaries. 
Accordingly, we believe a comparison should be made with respect 
to the following individuals: 
1. Eric Varoz 
2. Celeste Denton 
3. Lee Liston 
4. Will Carlson 
5. Randall Harr 
Additionally, with respect to each of the foregoing 
identified individuals, we believe that a review and examination 
of certain information regarding each individual, would reveal a 
pay inequity circumstance. The information that should be 
reviewed is: 
1. Application for State employment, including all resumes 
demonstrating each individual's educational background and 
related work experience. 
2. Salary history for each individual. 
3. Classification and position history with respect to each 
individual. 
4. Disciplinary or corrective action history with respect 
to each individual. 
5. Performance evaluations for the past ten (10) years as 
to each individual. ^ 
LAW OFFICES OF \ L/OrlD 
PHILL IP W. DYER • GRIEVANT 
22 I K E A R N S SUILOING 
I 3<3 SOUTH MAIN S T R E E T * 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 IOI ' - . _ . . _ -
(801 ) 363-5COO 
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; \ 
6. Any unique agreements that the Department may have 
entered into with respect to each individual, 
7. All career mobility agreements with respect to each 
individual. 
Once the foregoing information is obtained, I believe your 
Human Resource Analyst should be able to review what has been, 
historically, considered and analyzed in determining a pay 
inequity circumstance. AS I told you at our meeting, there 
exists historical documentation concerning what would constitute 
a pay inequity circumstance. I promised to provide that 
historical documentation to you and am attaching hereto the 
following documents, to-wit: 
1. DHRM Bulletin dated July 1, 1990. 
2. A letter dated August 8, 1990, from then executive 
director of DHRM, Earl Banner- •; 
If you examine the foregoing historical documents and the 
information we believe to be pertinent as:set forth hereinabove, 
I believe the appropriate analysis would then be to examine that 
information in light of certain variables. Those variables 
should be compared as between Messrs. Burr and Clark and those 
individuals identified herein above. Those variables are as 
follows, to-wit: 
1. Educational credentials. 
• 2. Employment experience related to the position. 
3. Performance ratings. 
4. Past pay/hiring practices of the Department. 
5. Preferential treatment of one (1) employee over 
another. 
Once the information is put together and analyzed in view of 
the foregoing factors, I believe that you will see that Messrs. 
Burr and Clark have been inequitably treated and should be 
granted- a salary increase as sought in their grievance. 
Lastly, as I understood our discussion, you have agreed to 
extend the timelines regarding my client's processing of the 
grievance so that the foregoing information can be obtained^and 
analyzed. So that Mr. Bob White, at the Career Service Review 
2 000P53-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
; ) 
Board, is aware of the status of this matter, I have provided him 
with a copy of this letter based upon the foregoing agreement'. 
Thank you for your consideration of this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
PWD/jms 
Enclosure 
CC: Craig Burr 
Lowell Clark 
Thomas R. Bielen, Executive Director, UPEA 
Robert White, Administrator, CS:RB 
MI\E:\CIient\U-GOP\Haun Pete 000211 U-GOP 1001.08 
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~~ ********* ^>wv%y^min( men CSRB 
/ V^gPfc ' Gr/evant 
/ . *—VZZ~I '^ JL Exhibit # 
0WfJ I30OQ2J 
DHRM Bulletin oH/w-90-012 
flule 
£jr#ctrr*DiC*: 7-1-90 Rt&rtnca; P<*fl3-7~3 
SUBJECT: Hiring Up To Mid-Point p ^ J ^ t 
of Sa7ary Pange 
State agencies art authorized to pay salaries up to the mid-
point of the appropriate pay range for newly hired employees if 
market conditions require such action. However, such decisions are 
net to be used to create internal salary inequities with otfcer 
employees wnich become rationale for subsecuent requests to OHRH 
for apcroval of special inequity salary-adjustments. 
Oeoartmants ara advised that inequities ara craataa wnan a 
newly hired employee is paid mora than a currant incumbent(e) 
unless such pay differential is justified because of one of tha 
following raasona; 
U Higher aducaticnal credentials 
2. Mora total employment experience applicable to tha 
position 
J* Low performance ratings that may hava restricted the cay 
level of the current emoloyeefs) 
In tjy event of a department oaefsfon to hire an individual 
above c/u^HErent pay rata of incumbent* which creates a pay acuity 
. conditfoijEjtparoaents are recuired to suomit requests for special 
salary fl^aetJcents for current employees with apprccriate 
explanations to DHRH to resolve inequities* 
Potential inequities are to be identified, studied *na 
resolved before being created- All funding for special saTary 
Inequity adjustments is done withfn bsse budgets of departments* 
HTHORIZATICH # 
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)§ifJ3 Dement of ^ ) J n Resource Mana^em*^ 
0 r r OTt * • * • 0*c* • * - * " * 
CSRB 
Gnevanf 
&h/Wt # 
August 8, 1990 - * JxJ 
Suzarme D+ndoy, M.D., H.F.H. 
Executive Director 
Department o f Health 
JKJILDIWG KAIL . . 
Dear Suzanne ; 
I aa v r i t i n j i n response to your o«ao to ae dated J u l y 27, 1990 concerning salary 
grievances in the Division of £nvironaental Health. I t i s ay policy to respond 
off ic ia l ly to agency requests for special salary or inequity adjustaents when 
they have bean suboitted froa the Departaent Director, or vhere the Division 
Directors have been delegated authority to aaie such requests i n behalf of the 
Departaent. DHRH should not be i n a position of f inal iz ing an. action with 
Division Directors when the Departaent Director has not ye t had the opportunity 
to approve the Division request. Yet, ve v i l l always s tr ive to be a resource 
in discussing potential solutions to Issues MS part of the preliminary 
considerations. 
You have asked that I mddrmss the questions that you have raised in your aeao 
to Engineers and Environmental Sc ient i s t s , dated July 27, 1990. As I do so, I 
v i l l reference the attached aeao froa Dick McDonald d*fd April 2 , 1990. 
Health Question 1 The definition of an inequity i s an injust ice or unfairness 
as i t relates to eaployees' coapensation. An Inequity a* i t relatea to salaries 
o f eaployees in the saae c lass i f icat ion vould be evidenced by different salaries 
paid to different employees vbea other variables are the reae or equal. 
Variables to consider are education, experience, hire dAtBs/r*t+s, performance 
ratings, aer i t increase aaounts, e tc . 
DicJcKcDooald's aeao of April 2, s t a t e s . In rmgArds to vhat aight Justify special 
salary adjustaenc; *Kev hire employees are hired at a salary rate equal to or 
above those of current eaployees, in the MMmm Job c lass i f icat ion . • 
I t vould appear that the situation in £nviroaaental Health be such an inequity 
L£ there Arm no specific Just i f icat ions for dif ferential p^y. 
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c i r c i s a s c a n c e s w h i c h do
 t , ;-L£ j u s t i f y a * p e c i * l a d j u s C a e n C " E i i p l o y e e s a r t P*td 
d i f f e r e n t u l i r y n c c j in the * M e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n p*y r a n g e b e c i u j i o f d i f f e r e n t 
hir< d a c e s , p e r f o r n a n c e r a c i n g s , mnd u n u r e . " I b i l U v u a g e n c y act - in Is era c o n 
11.1 • c t: •• ii p 11 ») e # J t o r p r o no c i i n o i i th * b a J I • < f % \ i « : 1 f * c c o r J JI s p « r f o m a nc t , 
c o a p t c c n c t # < s u i t a b i l i t y f o r cho new p o s i t i o n . C c n u r t , e t c . Employees who are 
promoted are s e l e c t e d and rewarded f o r t h e above n a i l e d f a c t o r s . Tha aaount o f 
p r o »o C 1 o n , a i y o u k n o w „ 1 i o p 1.1 o n a 1 a t a g o i ) < i y d 1 :i < : r e t i < > n w i t h I n p * r aa e C a r s g 1 v t n 
in DRRH r u l e s 1 b a l i e \ e JcJuInls t r a t o r s l o o k a t Che c u r r e n t s a l a r y r a t e s of a l l 
ocher e m p l o y e e s i n t h e sanjc c l a s s i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e t h e y d e t e r a i n e the p e r c e n t 
i n c r e a s e f o r t h o s e t o be proaottd i n t o t h a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . D e c i s i o n s are then 
a a ci c to p r oao t • o v e I* ,„ t q I LA, 1 t o
 # o r b e 1 o w • C h e r a t c s o f c u r r e n C e rap 1 oy e e s . A 11 
three o p t i o n s i r t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e a g e n c y a d m i n i s t r a t o r and are gener a 1 1 y 
oade to a v o i d c r e a t i n g i n e q u i t i e s o r a o r a l a p r o b l e m s . 
H c t l t h (hi f 111 on 3 Employees do n o t Kav« MT\ T e n t l c l c n t n c " t o a n y pMy i n c r e a s e , 
except-COLA'* d i c t a t e d by the L e g i s l a t u r e . A g e n c y a d m i n i s t r a t o r s c o n t r o l t h e i r 
budgets and r • v a r d emp 1 o y c • * wi t h I n c u r r e n t DHRM r u I e s and g u i d e l i n e 5 , . How« ver 
• a g e n c i e s have, t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o be c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r t r e a t n e n t o f 
a ap 1 oy e e s . In 11 is t a n c e s o f i d e n t i f 1 eci 1 n c : o n s i s t e n c i e s * , t h e r e m i.y 1 n f a c t be 
u n f a i r o r u n j u s t t r e a t m e n t . 
I t i s up t o ' t h e ' a g e n c y t o r e s e a r c h a l l t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g c l a i m e d i n e q u i t i e s , 
and f o r w a r d r e q u e s t s f o r s p e c i a l a d j u s t m e n t s t o DHRH w h e n t h e a g e n c y I s c o n v i n c e d 
t hjt t JI • i tua 11 o n o £ u n fa I rn e s s e x I s t s... S p e c i f I c a 11 y a n s v e r .1 n g you r q u e s t i o n, 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l H e a l t h promoted c e r t a i n e m p l o y e e s t o a h i g h e r pay r a t e than o t h e r s . 
I d o n ' t know i f t h i s s i t u a t i o n t h a t h a s b e e n c r e a t e d b y E n v i r o n m e n t a l H e a l t h nay 
have r e s u l t e d . In a n I n e q u i t y o r I f t h e r e a r e j u s t i f i a b l e r e a s o n s f o r d i f f e r e n t 
p ay i s: I ha v e n<:: t I" © v i e v c ci t h e d e t a i 1 o £ e a c h ,: e nrp 1 o y e e i n vo 1 v c d 
I he „£.i,ctors Co be c o n s I d e r e d i n de t e r a I n 1 ng v h o s h o \ 11 ci h a v e theI .r sa 1.ar 1 • s ra.1 s e d 
! i a ' ii j: re v i o 'Us ly h e e n I d e n 11 f I e ci... Comp a r i s o n s s h o t 1.1 ci b e ma • :I e i n i t la. 1 l y w 11 h i n 
a vork u n i t f o r c o m p a r a b l e j o b s , b u t son* r e v i e w s h o u l d b e iiAde f o r c o m p a r a b l e 
j o b s t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n t i r e Agency In o r d e r d > bo a s c o n s i s t e n t and f a i r a s 
p o s s 1 b 1 e I n th e t r e a Da e n t o £ a 11 enrp 1 oy e e s 
^ Q f ^ t ^ ^ ^ y ^ i ^ ^ I n e q u i t i e s don C j u s t h a p p e n when e m p l o y e e s art- p r o n K ) c e d . 
I n e q u i t i e s a r e c r e a t e d e i t h e r I n t e n t i o n a l l y o r t h r o u g h o v e r s i g h t vhan s a l a r y 
I. nc i: • i i: i s a i • aru t h o r I z a d by a g a n c y o £ f I c 1 a 1 :i ITi e v ay C <:> a 1. n i » 1 z • ,1 oexj i i i 11 a s 
i s s i m p l y a c i r t f i ; i ] r e v i e w o f a l l p e r t i n e n t d a t a a a c h t i n a a s a l a r y incraa-sa 
• d e c i s i o n i s aidt . . . A d h e r e n c e t o c o n s i s t e n t i n t e n i a l h i r i n g and p r o m o t i o n a l 
p r a c t i c e s s h o u l d v i r t u a l l y e l l a l n a t a a l l i n e q u i t i e s . I r e v e n t l o n 1M a l w a y s b a t t e r 
than o i re . 
11 i s uaaa ry » p r ooo t i c:> n s s h OH 11 ci XLQ £ c r mM c • ^ ] Ji • <:I"" ]i: ^ ,::: 1 • •il: 1 • ^ l::"'': :i • **? 1 o y a e s vi , • a i: a 
c urr • n t l y 1 n th « m JLB§ « c 1 a t j 1 f .„!. c a c i o n a i x I ,;• «, 1 a i: ;y ] a • 1 I I i a s a 1 a r y rang a f o r th a 
s p e c i f i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s equ 1 t y £ o r a 11 v 1 i • •> - c • parformIng the 
d u t i e s / r a s p o n s i b i 1 1 11« s In th a C c l a s s ! f i c a t i o n , "I h a a c 11 • - : i •• I a ry oo tha r a rig e 
I s d e p e n d a n t on a g r e a t nuabar o f v a r i a b l e s 1 1 ] • \ ar ! • • • ! •. j u s t i f y d i f f e r e n t 
s a l a r y r a t e s f o r p e o p l e i n the MM at* c l a MM if i c a t i o n and • * : * ; y r a n g e . Only lA^^n 
the va r 1 a b 1 a s 11 > C! i e s n a & b i i c s i .1 m z i e s i r • d .1 f f e r e n t , d c » « i i n 1, n » qu .1 t y • x 1 s t 
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mr. ^ - _ mwrn+^t M*W IIWU ^•^••cf;.,;;''Wi"» *r ^ ©arora tha o r i g i n a l 
promotional pa/ dtclslona vara aiada, va aubaaqiiantly *wc a t l a a a t twica v i t h 
chaai to addrtjj chair problaau. 
I i «i 1 11 ba .happy now to ravlav and raapond to n hat* var cha Haalth i^p^rcaant 
daairaa co"sub«ic for tha l d a n t l f l a d Inaqult la*. I f tha J u a t i f i c a c i o n and 
" documentation aubalttad ia auppordva of granting Momm s p e c i a l i ' 
adjustments, than DifltK wi l l approve than. DHRH w i l l ba happy Co f u n tiar IIIICUJJ 
ary liiiiMi r>iw o i" i r , . i r JOUI formal raquast . 
5I \r • r 11 r, * . : . **• 
Earl J Bannar, Exacutiva Diractor 
Department of Huavan Rasouma Management 
EJB/RKM/J1 
cc : fcobart Whita 
B ob Hayvood 
Dick McDonald 
John Mathevs 
Nancy Sachrast - UPEA ' . : 
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So ttl*l S i l t .FT Ad luataen 1 : i 
Centra l ly , a p e c i a l malar / ad jus tments ar t 01 il> a ^ v . . , , .^ 
an inequi ty can c l e a r l y be demons tra ted , U s u a l l y i r . i / , , ^ , 
• y en t h a p pe n JI or c i r c urn* t an c e s o c :: u i y h i c h • : , I n e q u i t y , 
Soave t x impltji 1.1: a: 
- j» I" rub J i 1 ouju / mi, " mi* «i H i l l ^ w e ! a p r o b a t i o n a r y a a l a r y 
1 IH: 4-it i j • wtitch mi mit t the* to an equal or h i t h e r s a l a r y l e v e l 
than ii"'it' »-*i r r iiii,ili i employee! M the aajie Job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
2 . ^ w M i r r i a p i o / e r i n n h ired a t a a a l a r y r a t e e q u a l to c 
; uffl i f ( u n n i l rmpluyc f i , in the sajne Job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
3 . i^-ploycri i ii i^j,, | t * i i *rccr.r i n c r e a a e vhen 
promotd IT r ci 1 t i t I f I r'i
 ( ' ' t h e aaae Job 
clasal f ' T l n. 
I,. A d a i n i n n I* a vi c l e r i c a l e r r o r s In peroonn 
i n " »* ' i i ' F ' y L i ^ u n t i , e ^ f e r t W a d a t e s , e t c . 
f f f i r r r l i l i r ra taent . of ont employee over a n o t h e r employee . 
Clrcraaatanceit wnuu do jx^i j u j u f j 1 n n^rj 1*1 a a l a r y adjustment 
1 . toployei. J • | ^ M i l f f t r e u a a J a : / r a t e s i n the a a a e . 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n pay r a n t * b a c a u i i r *\ + frrrvr h i r e d a t e a , 
n«rfor»jinct r a t i n g s , nud t e n u r e . 
rin-H i | T e x c e p t i o n a l Jnb „ierformance. • • 
* h up' if A. I n r r t i i M I ifir u s e ^ " i* f r e e z e y<* 
d i f f e r e n t l a v r 1 i fJ • ' I M j .a i *LL.ain»«nta ^ i i . i t Job 
l a a s l f i c a t i o n , 
erf "ma'.ce f i r t o i j i n for J u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
t ! n funds t » i < , i1 if ' i "i-iiH1 m p l o y t a a . 
7 • r i s o r vhi \ mi ,a ' i 111 ii tliAi a subordinata e * p l o y t t . 
* icre*M6M \ i i i I  i n / I I n s l b l l l L l t s . 
~eqo#ste r*r s i e / U I s a l a r y a d j u s t m e n t s , o r aquit y a d j u n i l • « • * i : t i ihould • . 
v t t i .ni accoi i i inj ; to tl § ihore j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . 
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COUNTi O-1 ^ALT LAKE 
Carey ?!! Seager bei ng Ii :i ] y swoi : ii • i e p o s e s a n d s a y s : 
That she serve d REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS CRAIG BURR 
2 JI CLAR K i i]:: :>] :n t l :i e fo] ] owd ng par t i es - -ci i ig t: ; ; i : 
(2) true and correct copies thereof In an envelope addressed 
to : 
Brent A. Burnett, Esq. 
Asslstaiv ~;:tcrriey General 
ISO East 3C0 Sou:::: •'",- v'-
P.O. Box 14C8Lr 
Sa ] t I .a>^ 
Robert W. Thompson, 
Admini strator 
Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake i^t-.v TTT 84114 
and mailing the same, sealed, wi th fi rst class postage 
p r e p a :i d t h e r e o i l :ii i :i t: I: :i e I J i :i :i t e d S t a t e s M a :i 1 a t S <E i 1 t I i a k e 
City, Utah, on the 
2(3 04 . 
3^  day of ! 'fcxW? • 
c: 
yciAU.'s 0?a^p 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s 
j£^VlU#4P , 2004 . 
r e s 3ft*t/o4 
ta i ry Publ ic 
e p i d i n g at": 
ISP a t t Lake nour t 
: v 
' " ; 
day 
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